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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between energy consumption and income inequal-
ity in an unbalanced panel of 147 countries over the period 1990 - 2014. Using a variety of
panel and dynamic panel methods and controlling for other determinants of inequality, such
as education, health, investment, etc., I find a large and strong negative relationship between
access to energy and income inequality. Moreover, I demonstrate that greater access reduces
the share of income enjoyed by the top 20% and increases the share for the bottom 20%.
Results are less robust when the sample is divided into regions and economic ‘blocs’, but the
overall results are unchanged.
JEL Codes: E02, O43, O54, Q43
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Introduction
In his 1996 speech to the Royal Econometric Society President Atkinson (1997) announced that
research on income distribution, or inequality, had “come in from the cold”. Fast forward to 2013
when Piketty (2013) published Capital in the Twenty-First Century – compactly, and thoughtfully,
summarized in Piketty (2015) – and one could say income distribution has “come in”. What has
not yet been fully resolved, however, are the causes of and possible remedies to income inequality.
Indeed, there is an ongoing discussion on whether inequality is necessarily a “bad” or simply part
of natural economic development, for example Hasanov and Izraeli (2011). Put another way, under
what conditions is inequality tolerated in the greater context of economic growth (Hirschman and
Rothschild, 1973)?
To that end, the focus of this paper is to investigate the – to date unanalyzed – impacts of
access to energy on income inequality. Using an unbalanced panel of 147 countries over the period
1990 to 2014 the primary finding is that access to energy reduces income inequality, using two
measures of income inequality. Subsample analysis reveals that energy’s impact on inequality
varies by region and economic status. I also find that greater energy consumption reduces the top
10% and 20% income shares while increasing the income share of the bottom 10% and 20%.
As discussed in Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002), and seconded by Milanovic (2011), overall
global inequality increased from the post-revolutionary era (about 1800) to World War II, and
thereafter stabilized through the end of their sample in 1992, supporting the Kuznets’s (1955)
inverted-U relationship between per capita income and income inequality. However, recently Bed-
does (2012) updated their data and show that the Kuznets inverted-U curve found in Bourguignon
and Morrisson (2002) has recently become an “italicized n”, that is, there has been a recent uptick
in inequality. A similar argument can be found in List and Gallet (1999), who showed that the n
shape is due, in part, to the shift away from manufacturing towards service production, particu-
larly in advanced countries.
The OECD (2014) confirms the rise of inequality among OECD countries, with the Gini
coefficient rising three points over the past two decades. Furthermore, the OECD argues that
this increase in inequality has led to a 0.35% decline in annual growth rates for the past 25 years.
Adding to the ambivalence, Anand and Segal (2008) establish there is no conclusive evidence as
to which direction inequality is heading.
To date, the majority of empirical income inequality literature is concentrated on five major
categories: growth, human capital (i.e. education and health), government policy, institutions, and
investment. As might be expected, as in the growth literature, there are considerable differences in
the direction of the causality, which leads to an endogeneity problem: does lower income inequality
improve, say, human capital, or vice-versa?
An intuitively attractive implication of better health is improved income inequality. As in the
growth literature, an increase in health increases worker productivity and leads to higher income,
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which should, in turn, lead to greater equality. Using US county level data, Daly and Wilson (2013)
show that, despite earlier research which could not conclusively prove that improved health leads
to better income distribution, there is a statistically significant negative relationship between
mortality and income equality. On the other hand, Deaton (2003), in his survey of the effects
of income distribution on health, not vice-versa, is unable to convincingly argue that improved
equality unambiguously improves health. Herzer and Nunnenkamp (2011), after correcting for
endogeneity, cross-country heterogeneity, and omitted country fixed effects, provide evidence to
the contrary. Less ambiguous are the impacts of education on inequality. Again, the intuition
is attractive, more education leads to higher productivity and income, reducing inequality, as in
Gregorio and Lee (2002).
With respect to the effects of institutions on income inequality, Alesina and Perotti (1996)
confirm that reduced equality fuels social discontent which destabilizes the political structure
making investment more uncertain potentially undermining future growth. On the other hand,
Barro (2000) is unable to corroborate this result, but does find evidence supporting the Kuznets
curve. In their examination of corruption and inequality and poverty, Gupta, Davoodi, and
Alonso-Terme (2002) demonstrate that rising levels of corruption, and their channels, exacerbate
inequality and poverty. Later, Esfahania and Ramı´rez (2003) find that institutions in concert with
better infrastructure can lead to lower income inequality.
Other factors contributing to income inequality include: investment, migration and remittances
(Barham and Boucher, 1998); foreign direct investment, (Borenszteina, Gregorio, and Lee, 1998);
and fiscal policy (IMF, 2014). Clearly, this is an incomplete list, but points to the general trend
in the extant literature.
A key determinant of economic welfare is access to energy, given it impacts on both firm and
household production. According to a recent study by the International Energy Agency about
17%, or 1.2 billion of the global population, do not have access to electricity (IEA, 2016). There
is a substantial literature dedicated to understanding of how energy consumption contributes to
growth, generally using panel cointegration techniques or dynamic panel methods, for example,
Lee (2005), Huang, Hwang, and Yang (2008), Belke, Dobnik, and Dreger (2011), Chen, Chen,
and Chen (2012), and Herrerias, Joyeux, and Girardin (2013). However, the consensus from
this literature is inconclusive. In a survey of the energy and growth literature Ozturk (2010)
demonstrates that there is conflicting evidence on the relationship and asks future authors to
consider approaches which do not rely on cointegration and/or causality tests. He also suggests
that authors conduct a variety of robustness checks by changing the sample period, variables,
and/or sample data.
A number of studies have also looked at the relationship between per capita income and
environmental quality and/or pollution, producing estimates of the environmental Kuznets curve.
In an unbalanced panel of 42 countries Torras and Boyce (1998) find evidence for the Kuznets
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curve over five sources of pollutants. But Borghesi (2000) finds that depending on the methodology
used, pooled OLS versus fixed effect panel, results can be dramatically different, echoing his earlier
survey of the environmental Kuznets curve, Borghesi (1999) hinting at the need for more robust
estimation, as discussed in Ozturk (2010).
This paper is the marriage of the income inequality literature and research on the effects of
energy use on growth. Its closest antecedent is a paper by Padilla and Serrano (2006) which
demonstrates that an increase in income inequality leads to inequality in the distribution of CO2
emissions across both countries, e.g. East and West Europe, and income groups, high versus low
income. This paper employs a battery of panel regression models – standard random and fixed
effects, fixed effect IV and 2SLS, GMM-IV, and system GMM – to determine the effects of energy
use on income inequality using two measures of inequality, the Gini coefficient and the ratio of
high to low income shares. I then consider impacts on regions and economic ‘blocs’ to investigate
the idiosyncratic impacts of energy on equality. Finally, I exploit data on the top-to-bottom 10%
and 20%, respectively, income shares to test energy asymmetries across income strata.
Overall, I find that energy use is strongly correlated to declines in income inequality. Moreover,
this result is robust to various specifications, methods, and measures of energy use, income,
institutional measures, and definitions of income inequality. Indeed, the results demonstrate
that access to energy has a substantial impact on inequality on par with economic growth, and
larger than other “traditional” determinants such as institutions, human capital, government
consumption, and investment.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 1 introduces a simple theoretical
model to motivate the empirical analysis; Section 2 outlines the empirical panel model strategy,
reviews the data used and discusses the initial results; Section 3 introduces the dynamic panel
methods used and sheds light on the overall results; in Section 4, I conduct analysis on subsamples
of the data to test for regional and economic structure idiosyncrasies and check for asymmetric
effects on income shares. Finally 5 provides some brief summary remarks.
1 A Simple Theoretical Model
Though this paper’s focus is the empirical analysis, I begin by constructing a simple two sector
and three-input, profit maximizing model to motivate the statistical strategy. Consider a standard
Cobb-Douglas production function, which conforms to the Inada conditions, that, in addition to
capital and labor, also includes energy as in input. There are two income groups, or “sectors, high
(h) and low (`) each with its own specific production function, differentiated by input shares and
levels of inputs,
Yi = Aif(Ki, Li, Ei) = AiK
αi
i E
βi
i L
(1−αi−βi)
i , i = h, ` (1)
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time subscripts are repressed for clarity. K is capital, E is energy use, L is labor, or more
accurately, effective labor, A is a productivity measure and α/β are the output shares of capital
and energy respectively. Labor and capital are assumed to be homogeneous and perfectly mobile
within each income group, but not across sectors, similar to the specific factors trade model.
Energy is homogeneous and mobile within and across income groups. Wages in the high income
group are assumed to be strictly higher than for low income workers.
Next we define the resource constraints
K = Kh +K`, E = Eh + E`, L = Lh + L`
and aggregate output
Y = Yh + Y`.
The total cost constraint is standard,
C =
h∑
j=`
(rjKj +QEj + wjLj),
r, w and Q are the prices of capital, labor, and energy. Because energy is homogeneous across
income groups, Q ≡ Qh = Q`, while prices paid to capital and labor differ across sectors.
Of interest to this paper is the effects of energy use on high-to-low relative labor income,
denoted ŵ. Relative wages are given by the first order condition for high income labor, after
substituting in the resource constraints. The income differential across the high and low income
sectors is assumed to be positive and equal to
ŵ ≡ w∗h − w∗` = θh · yh − θ` · y`, (2)
where y = Y/L is per capita output and θ = (1−α−β) is the output share of labor. It is easy to
show how the differential changes with respect to changes in energy shares and access to energy
in the production function:
∂ŵ
∂βh
= −Yh
[
1− θh(lnEh + lnLh)
]
≷ 0 (3)
∂ŵ
∂β`
= Y`
[
1− θ`(lnE` + lnL`)
]
≷ 0 (4)
∂ŵ
∂Eh
= βhθh
yh
Eh
> 0 (5)
∂ŵ
∂E`
= −β`θ` y`
E`
< 0. (6)
y/E is the average level of per capita output per unit of energy. Equations (3) – (4) each have
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an ambiguous sign and depend on the relationship 1− θ(lnE + lnL). Clearly as the labor share,
θ, approaches 0 the sign becomes unambiguously negative in equation (3) and vice-versa in (4).
Equations (5) and (6) are less ambiguous and are intuitively attractive, more access to energy in
the high sector increases the income differential and the differential compresses when energy is
added to the low sector.
This model nests two possibilities with respect to per capita capital and energy:
k ≡ kh = k` and e ≡ eh = e` (7)
αh = α` and βh = β` (8)
First, equation (7) states that per capita capital and energy for use in production is evenly split
between high and low income earners, but the input shares differ. The opposite is true in equation
(8), input shares are the same, but access to factor stocks differs. Invoking this second condition
allows us to simplify equation (2) significantly to
ŵ = θ · (yh − y`), (9)
the wage differential is proportional to the per capita output differential across income groups.
To conclude the analysis, we concentrate on the output differential in (9). First, convert
equation (1) into per capita terms,
yi = Aik
αi
i e
βi
i
and take the ratio of the high to low sectors
yh
y`
=
Ah
A`
kαhh e
βh
h
kα`` e
β`
h
.
Without loss of generality, assume that the capital and electricity stocks are the same each sector,
as in equation (7). Taking natural logs we have
(ln yh − ln y`) = ÂHL + α ln k + β ln e. (10)
where ÂHL ≡ ln(Ah/A`), α ≡ (αh − α`) and β ≡ (βh − β`). Collectively equations (9) and (10)
are the basis of our empirical analysis, substituting (10) into (9) yields
ŵ = θÂHL + αθ ln k + βθ ln e (11)
where αθ = θα and βθ = θβ. The implications are straightforward: Changes to total factor
productivity and access to energy can expand or contract income inequality, depending on the
sign of βθ. The results of this simple model are similar to those found in the dynamic model
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of Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2012). In their model, the effects of public goods investment is
sensitive to how public investments are financed but they do decrease income inequality in short
run, but increase it in the long run.
2 Empirical Model, Data, and Results
We begin our discussion by specifying a standard panel model given by:
yit = α + βqit + x
′
itγ + λt + εit, (12)
where y is a measure of income inequality, given alternatively as ln(Gini), and the ratio of the
10% and 20% of the richest to poorest income share, Sharetopr /Share
bottom
r , r = 10%, 20%. q is
the log measure of energy use.x is a vector of control variables. λt is a time fixed effect and εit
is a random disturbance, discussed in greater detail in equation (13), below. Ex-ante, estimates
of β, δ, and the control coefficient vector, γ, should be negative if the variables reduce income
inequality.
The specification in equation (12) is first estimated using panel fixed and random effect models,
nested in equation (12). If α = 0 and
εit = µi + uit;uit ∼ N(0, σ2u) (13)
we have the fixed effect model where µi is a time invariant unobserved state fixed effect and uit is
a random disturbance, with the orthogonality condition E(µi, εit) = 0 equation (12) is the fixed
effect model. On the other hand, if µi is random with
µi ∼ iid(0, σ2µ)
E(µi, xit) = 0, and
α = 0
equation (13) is the random effects model. E(µi, xit) = 0 represents the orthogonality condition
that the fixed effects and regressors are uncorrelated.
2.1 Data and Characteristics
The unbalanced panel sample period covers the years 1990 – 2014 for 147 countries, see Table A1
in the Appendix for a list of countries. With the exception of the institutional variables, discussed
below, most of the data are available from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI)
collected from various sources. The list of the variables and their sources are in Table 1. British
Thermal Unit (BTU) data is from the US EIA. For dependent variables, and as a robustness check,
I use three different measures of income inequality: the log of the Gini coefficient;and the ratio
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of the 10:10 and 20:20 income shares, denoted “10%/20% Ratio” respectively. This measure, or
similar to it, for inequality can be found in a number of studies, such as Gottschalk and Smeeding
(2000) and Daly and Wilson (2013).
Energy use is given by per capita consumption of kilowatt hours (pc kWhs) and aggregate BTU
consumption. According to Foster and Bedrosyan (2014) energy production is the single largest
cause of CO2 greenhouse emissions accounting for roughly 41% the global total, so it is also
worth considering using CO2 emissions as an instrument for energy consumption. A complication
of using this, however, is that the commons nature of pollution makes accounting for emission
sources difficult. Nevertheless, CO2 emissions will be used in the the first stage of 2SLS regressions
as a robustness check.
The control variables used include those generally found in the inequality and growth litera-
ture. First, to account for economic growth and/or technological change, we use per capita real
GDP in local currency units. As shown by Nuxoll (1994), using international prices, such as the
$US, leads to systematically different growth rates as compared to using GDP in domestic prices,
called the Gerschenkron effect. Thus, Nuxoll (1994) suggests that estimates using GDP in the do-
mestic currency are more reliable.1 Two human capital controls are included: primary education
enrollment as percent of school age children and percent of GDP spent on health expenditure.
Note that these variables are ex ante “inputs” rather than ex post outcomes, and can thus be in-
tended as investment expenditures with a particular goal in mind, such as income growth, poverty
reduction, and/or quality of life improvements. Private non-financial investment and government
consumption, both as a percentage of GDP, are used to account for changes in productivity, the
accumulation of real assets and infrastructure investment.
Economic composition differences across the countries are proxied by the percent rural popu-
lation and the value added of manufacturing as percent of GDP. Regional cross sectional hetero-
geneity is accounted for by time invariant regional fixed effects. Also included is the IMF’s global
recession indicator used to correct for global downturns. The IMF recession dates correspond to
the 2007-08 financial crisis, so this variable also captures this impacts. Variables which are not in
percent or ratios are in natural logs.
To account for institutional heterogeneity, I use the average of two measures calculated by the
Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World index (EFWI) (Lawson and Hall, 2016): the
protection of property rights (Area 2C) and extra payments/bribes/favoritism (Area 5Civ, denoted
“‘Bribe”). Property rights was chosen for a couple of reasons. First, as argued by North and
Thomas (1973) and North (1989) well developed institutions contribute to economic growth via
incentives, property rights, and the reduction of transaction costs. North (1989) further developed
a theory of the impacts of institutional change on economic growth. Acemmoglu, Johnson, and
1Per capita real GDP in $US and PPP per capita real GDP in $US were also used with little change in the
results.
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Robinson (2005) corroborate the findings of North (1981, 1989) and North and Thomas (1973) in
that the protection of property rights and the allocation of resources are necessary for economic
growth. While this paper does not specifically concentrate on economic growth, the importance
of institutions on warrants considering them in the context of income inequality, see Bennett and
Vedder (2013).
The category “bribes” is chosen as it is aligned with corruption and rent-seeking which are
likely to impact access to energy and serves as an instrument for democracy. Also, there is
a literature on corruption and economic performance which makes comparisons to the growth
literature possible, for example, Barro (1996), Barro (2000), and Podobnik, Shao, Njavro, Ivanov,
and Stanley (2008), and inequality, Gupta et al. (2002).
For sensitivity analysis, and to act as a robustness check, I also used a variety of substitute
variables for controls, such as $US PPP per capita real GDP, secondary and tertiary education
indicators, and a health variables such as infant mortality rates, life expectancy, etc. with little
change in the results.
Descriptive statistics of the unbalanced panel data can be found in Table 2 which includes the
number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum for each of the data.
Data at the top of the table are dependent variables. kWhs and BTUs are the variables of interest.
CO2 will be used in panel two stage least squares (2SLS) as a robustness check. The education and
health data are helpful in making comparisons to the extant literature. The remaining variables
are the controls.
Figures 1 and 2 show the mean of the Gini and the 20% income shares over the sample period,
with the upper and lower bound for each period. Figure 3 shows the average of per capita kWh
use globally, again with the upper and lower bounds. From the first two figures, we can see that
income distribution globally has been improving, particularly since 2000. We can also see the
impacts of the financial crisis in both figures with a rise in both the Gini coefficient, which rises
sharply, and the income ratio post 2010. Over the sample, we also see a steady incline per capita
kWhs used since the mid-1990s.
Results
Given the concentration on human capital, education and health, in the literature, I begin by
providing results for three “benchmark” RE and FE models: the first uses only the education
variable in the analysis, the second only health, and the third uses both. All three include the
institutional variable, the mean of the property rights and bribe freedom index. The benchmark
models use the same control vector as discussed above, but are not presented to avoid cluttering
the results.2 Results can be found in Table 3. Statistics in parentheses are robust p−values.
As can be seen only education expenditures have an impact on the Gini coefficient, at standard
2All results not presented throughout this paper are available from the author on request
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rejection probabilities. Health expenditures actually exacerbate the income ratio using the 10%
income ratio. Of note, the estimates for education are the same, at three decimal points, for the
more general version of the model, in the bottom panel of the Table. It’s also worth note that the
magnitude of the estimates are robust to the various specifications.
Turning our attention to the impact of energy on income inequality, the first set of panel
RE and FE regressions can be found in Table 4. In the interest in saving space, tables will
only include the results for energy, education, health, the mean of the freedom indices, and per
capital real GDP. Again robust p− values are in parentheses, stars are used to highlight statistical
significance with ‘*, **, ***’ at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.3 The overall R2o, the error
autoregressive coefficient, ρ, and the number of observations for each model are also tabulated.
All models include time fixed effects and the RE models include regional fixed effects to account
for heterogeneity.4 As argued in Borghesi (2000), in examining the relationship between income
inequality and the environmental quality, the FE model allows for unmeasurable time invariant
country specific fixed effects. He also argues that the RE model assumes that the fixed effects
are not correlated with other regressors. Therefore, for example, initial endowments of resources,
total factor productivity, etc., are orthogonal to output and inequality. One loss to using the FE
model in this context, however, is that we cannot control for regional fixed effects as they are
perfectly correlated with country fixed effects. Below, I divide the full sample into regional and
‘bloc’ subsamples and redo the regression models.
In the interest of preserving space, only the results for kWhs are discussed, however, the results
using BTUs are similar. As can be seen in the Table, with per capita kWhs as the energy variable,
only in the FE models using the Gini coefficient and the 10% income ratio does energy have any
discernible impact on the inequality, and both at the 10% rejection level. A quick robustness
check from the lower half of Table 4 provides supporting evidence. Education’s impact on income
inequality is about the same as in the benchmark models. Secondly, the institutional variable,
proxied by the mean of property rights and bribery, raises inequality when the Gini coefficient is
used, but has little other explanatory power in the remaining models. Robustness checks using
alternative human capital and GDP variables again have little effect on the results.
Investment and government consumption have explanatory power in reducing inequality when
using the Gini coefficient, but not the income ratios. It should be reiterated that the government
variables is consumption which does not specifically target inequality, as would, say, tax and/or
transfer policies. Rather, government consumption would have a more indirect effect on inequal-
ity, in the Keynesian sense, through direct public job creation and related indirect employment.
Moreover, in low income economies, relatively weak government institutions for tax collecting or
transfers, mitigate the effectiveness of redistribution policies. Indeed, even in high income coun-
3Regressions using clustered standard errors were also conducted, with little change in the results.
4The regions are: Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Asia, Western and Eastern Europe, and the Russian
Federation, examined in Section 4 below.
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tries, government represents a large percentage of total employment. For example, public sector
employment in Norway accounts for roughly 35% of the total (OECD, 2015).
These results provide some evidence in favor of much of the previous literature of the impacts
of human capital on income inequality, for example, Daly and Wilson (2013), Gregorio and Lee
(2002), and Castello´ and Dome´nech (2002).
FE-IV Results & 2SLS
However, an issue that may arise, as in the growth literature, there is likely to be some degree of
endogeneity in the statistical modeling process. This is, in part, due to the vagaries of the data.
First, the frequency of the data, which for many countries is not annual, or indeed at issued at
regular intervals. For example, the average number of observations for the Gini coefficient is about
8.04 over the sixteen year sample period. An additional concern is that income inequality variables
tend to be very stable over time. We begin by addressing endogeneity, and as a robustness check,
by conducting FE panel instrumental variable (IV) estimation using the lagged energy variable
and lagged per capita real GDP as instruments. Results for both kWhs and BTUs are in Table
5, control variable results are repressed for clarity. As before, robust p−values are used.
First, energy has a statistically significant impact on both the Gini coefficient and the 20%
income ratio. Across both definitions of energy, the elasticity of energy is about –0.15 when using
the Gini coefficient. For the 20% income ratio, the elasticity is between –2.9 and –7.6 depending
on your definition of energy. This difference is because kWhs are defined in per capita terms
whereas BTUs are total consumed. The education elasticity remains the same as in the previous
cases, but is relatively insignificant compared to energy coefficient estimates. As before, health
increases inequality, but only if the dependent variable is the 20% income ratio. Likewise the
freedom indices, lead to an increase in the Gini coefficient.
As discussed above, approximately 41% of CO2 emissions are generated by energy production,
thus they are good candidate for a 2SLS model, whereby energy is regressed on CO2 in the first
stage. RE and FE results of these tests using the Gini coefficient and the income ratios are in
Table 6. The energy coefficient estimates with the Gini and 20% ratio are similarly statistically
significant, particularly with the fixed effect model, found in the bottom half of the table, and are of
the hypothesized sign. Moreover, the estimates are similar to those in previous models. Likewise,
education and health coefficients are close to the same magnitude and statistical significance as
in previous models. Noteworthy is that the energy estimated elasticities and semi-elasticities are
generally greater, in absolute value, than the income estimated coefficients. Improvements to the
institutional variables worsen inequality. Finally, in the random effects model, increases in real
GDP lead to a statistically significant worsening of inequality.
Taking stock of the results thus far, the improved access to energy has consistent positive
impacts for income inequality that is robust to numerous specifications and sensitivity analysis.
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Moreover, the estimated coefficients are surprisingly uniform depending on the regresand in each
model specification.
3 Dynamic Panel Methods
A further step, is to address endogeneity, or simultaneity, using dynamic panel methods, initially
proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1981). As in the growth literature, the above models are likely
to have endogenously determined variables such that y ⇔ x leading to the simultaneity problem.
The argument is as follows, higher income, or less income inequality, leads to higher resource use,
and vice-versa. In this context higher levels of output lead to a desire for more energy while energy
use improves conditions for equality.
Econometrically, as is well documented, fixed effect models with a lagged dependent variable
biases the estimated coefficients, given that E(yit−1, εit) 6= 0. Without any exogenous regressors
Nickell (1981) demonstrated that ρ is biased by 1/T so that bias(ρˆ) → 0 as T → ∞. Because
of this, the panels discussed are only useful with a large time dimension. Moreover, Judson and
Owen (1999) demonstrate that the least squares dummy (LSDV) model, i.e fixed effect model with
lagged dependent variables, performs badly with small T . They show that the GMM estimator
works well with small T while the Anderson and Hsiao (1981) estimator performs well as T →∞.
Given these caveats I employ generalized method-of–moments (GMM) based IV estimation
which has advantages over standard IV estimation in that GMM is more efficient in the presence
of heteroskedasticity. While this may be less of a problem in a single country, across a panel of
large and small countries there is a potential for considerable heteroskedasticity.
To remove the panel fixed effects we can employ a dynamic framework by first converting
equation (12) into first differences, as in AH:
∆yit = ϕ1∆yit−1 + ϕ2∆qit + ϕ3∆ψit + ∆x′itγ + ∆εit, (14)
where ∆ is the one period difference operator. The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable
accounts for the dynamic development inequality and/or changes in total factor productivity. By
construction, this specification still contains correlation between the errors and lagged dependent
variable. As such, we can employ an IV approach using the second or higher order lagged depen-
dent variable as a valid instrument. This strategy can be employed even if ϕit follows an AR(1)
process by using higher order lagged dependent variables for instruments. This transformation re-
duces potential biases from omitted variables and the state specific fixed effects, which in standard
IV models would be nested in the panel error term in equation (13), µi.
However, as outlined above, Judson and Owen (1999) found the AH estimator performs badly
with small T . Arellano and Bond (1991) use a GMM approach to exploit the larger amount of
11
information contained in the sample. They argue that AH is consistent but fails to account for all
potential orthogonality conditions. In this approach they include lagged levels of the endogenous
variable, in differenced form and the exogenous variables. Later Arellano and Bover (1995) and
Blundell and Bond (1998), hereafter System GMM, demonstrated that lagged levels are poor
instruments for differenced variables, as in equation (14). They modified the AB model to also
include lagged differenced variables.
All dynamic models use, in addition to the energy variables and their lag, the two human capital
variables, per capita real GDP, and the institutional variable in the vector x. The overall policy
variable, government consumption, and economy structural variables, percent rural population
and value added by manufacturing, are treated as instruments.
Dynamic Panel Results
The dynamic panel GMM estimates are in Table 7. Estimated coefficients and their respective
p−values, calculated using two-step GMM standard errors, are organized by estimator and energy
variable. Results for the lagged dependent variable are not included, nor are the instrumental
variables estimates. Contemporaneous and lagged energy are significant for both the income share
regressands. On the other hand, for the Gini coefficient, the contemporaneous energy estimate is
positive, but not significant, however, lagged energy is negative and significant. Collectively, these
results indicate that access to energy may not have an immediate impact on inequality, but take
some time to come to fruition, corroborating results from the FE-IV model above.
Turing our attention to the remaining results: educational expenditures now lead to a sta-
tistically significant decline in inequality, as does GDP. Results for health and the institutional
variable, while significant, yield more ambiguous results. Health reduces inequality when BTUs
are used as the energy variable, and reduces the 10% income ratio. The institutional variable
generally raises inequality.
4 Subsample and Asymmetric Analysis
Next, we investigate the impacts of energy consumption on individual regions and economic ‘blocs’
and then consider the impacts of energy use on the the income shares independently of each other.
Asymmetric analysis tests if energy use has a different impact on the top and bottom 10% and
20% income shares respectively. Given that we have seen that kWhs and BTUs demonstrate
statistically similar results and in the interest of saving space, the estimates presented will only be
using per capita kWhs as the energy variable for the remainder of the text. Likewise, I concentrate
on the Gini coefficient and the 20% income ratio for the dependent variables.
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Regional and ‘Bloc’ Analysis
Because different regions will respond differently to increases in energy availability, the full sample
is divided first into five regions and, secondly, three economic ‘blocs’. The regions are: Latin
America, Asia, Western and Eastern Europe, and the Russian Federation. Asia includes SE Asia
and the Indian subcontinent. Africa and the Middle East have insufficient observations to conduct
analysis. The economic ‘blocs’ are: the current/former Communist economies (Comm), OECD,
and non-OECD (denoted –OECD). The term “Communist” is used as a political identifier rather
than an economic one.
Reasons for heterogeneity across regions are manifest. Differences in infrastructure, social and
legal institutions, historical accident, the level of development and source of energy are explana-
tions for why a different region income distribution reacts differently across the sample. Thus, it is
conjectured that greater access to energy will a larger impact on low income than in high income
countries. Results using FE model can be found in Table 8, Gini estimates are in the top half
and the 20% income share are in the bottom. Briefly, while the signs of the estimates are correct,
and similar to previous estimate coefficients, only energy reduces the Gini in Latin America and
Eastern Europe with any significance. While there is a significant reduction in the income ratio
for OECD countries.
Results for the FE-IV and 2SLS models are in Tables 9 and 10. Most of the FE-IV estimates,
Table 9, have the correct sign and are statistically significant, particularly when the Gini is used as
the dependent variable. As might be expected, given the non-linear nature of income inequality,
the largest elasticities are for the relatively underdeveloped countries in Latin America, Eastern
Europe, and the current/former Communist countries. Interestingly, the OECD has a larger, and
significant, estimate than the non-OECD countries, though this may be due to better defined rule
of law, captured by the institutional variable, than in non-OECD economies. As can be seen the
institutional estimate is negative, but not significant, in OECD countries whereas it is positive,
and significant, in non-OECD economies. Control estimates are in the neighborhood of previous
ones, though, as before, are more significant than in the benchmark FE regional models.
Results for the individual regions using 2SLS are less conclusive, see Table 10. We can see
that, with the exception of West Europe, the energy elasticity is negative across all four definitions
of freedom, though they are only statistically significant for Latin American and the communist
bloc. Finally, the GMM estimates, in Table 11, show no statistically significant contemporaneous
effect, but roughly a third of the lagged energy coefficients are significant and signed correctly.
A word of caution may be warranted, some of the estimates may suffer from the power problem
and therefore subject to type II errors. For example, the Asian panel has only 36 observations
which likely effect the efficiency and consistency of the models, particularly when using a FE
model.
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Income Shares
While the Gini coefficient meets several criteria required to be a good measure of income inequal-
ity – mean independence, population size independence, symmetry, and transfer sensitivity, see
Haughton and Khandker (2009) Chapter 6 – it does not allow for decomposing income into shares.
By using individual models for each income strata and comparing the results we can gain insight
to energy asymmetries. Consider the following panel models
STit = a
T
0 + a
T
1 qit + a
T
2 ψit + x
′
itγ
T + λTt + e
T
it, (15)
SBit = a
B
0 + a
B
1 qit + a
B
2 ψit + x
′
itγ
B + λBt + e
B
it , (16)
where S represents income share and the super-scripts T/B represent the top/bottom 10%/20%
income shares. These regressions are nested in equation (11) after removing the conditions found
in equations (7) and (8). In the previous regressions there is an implicit assumption that aTj = a
B
j ,
however, this need not be the case. Indeed, there is no theoretical or empirical justification for
this to be true. If we consider equation (11), ŵ expands and contracts from changes in w∗h and/or
w∗` . Alternatively, if we look at equation (10), the energey coefficient, β, in the standard panel
specification is given as β ≡ βh − β`, which are given as aTj and aBj above.
Results of this exercise can be found in Table 12 and include both RE and FE models. Im-
mediately apparent from both versions of the regressions is that raising energy use reduces the
top income shares and raises the share of the bottom income group, though with less statistical
significance. A Wald test, using a LSDV-SUR model, tests the null hypothesis aT1 = a
B
1 . In each
case, we can soundly reject the null hypothesis, for the 10% and 20% income ratios, χ2 (p−values)
are 29.21 (0.000) and 44.41 (0.000) for the 10% and 20% income shares respectively. Primary ed-
ucation expenditures reduce the upper income groups share while increasing the bottom income
share. Perhaps tautologically, the institution variable improves the upper income group, while
undermining the lower group’s income share.
The FE-IV and FE-2SLS energy estimates are in Table 13 and are similar to those in the
standard RE and FE table, but with greater statistical significance. Similarly results are found
for the human capital and freedom variables as well. The size of the estimates using the 2SLS
model is striking, the top shares lose considerably, estimates of about –22.0, while bottom gains
are substantial, between 4.2 and 8.2 depending on income share is measured. Education has the
biggest impact using the FE-IV model, and the role of institutions demonstrates substantial gains
for the upper income group and losses for the bottom group.
Lastly, the GMM results are tabulated in Table 14. As in the previous dynamic panel models,
most of energy’s statistically significant impact on inequality comes from lagged energy, but are the
same sign as contemporaneous energy in the previous models. In absolute value terms, the decline
in the upper income group’s share is significantly larger than the gains to the lower income group.
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Education and institutions have relatively homogeneous responses as in the previous asymmetric
models. Health expenditures favor the high income groups and hurt the low income groups.
Note, this does not imply that all the losses to the top 20% are transferred to the bottom
20% or all the gains for the bottom are at a cost to the top. Rather, this implies that the income
distribution is compressed. Put another way, the income distribution becomes less hour-glass
shaped. While previous estimates of inequality using the Gini coefficient and income ratio yield a
decline in inequality when energy use is increased, they do not necessarily imply how the disparity
is ameliorated. Nor do they, in the case of the Gini coefficient, discuss the shape of the Lorenz
curve as, for any given Gini coefficient, there are an infinite number of Lorenz curves.
5 Summary
In this paper, we examined the relationship between access to energy and income inequality. To
date, the majority of the literature on income inequality has concentrated on factors such as
per capita GDP, that is the level of development, human capital accumulation, and institutional
quality, with varying degrees of success. Using an unbalanced panel of 147 countries over a 25 year
sample, I find a strong negative causality between energy use and income inequality that is robust
to numerous specifications, techniques and variables. The policy implications are clear, should
economies desire to reduce income inequality, improving access to energy will aid this endeavor.
Moreover, there is little ambiguity, unlike education and health, about how access to energy can
be a positive influence on income distribution.
As a caveat, it should be noted that how energy produced is not a topic discussed in this paper.
Clearly, there are numerous issues surrounding energy production, primarily negative externalities
and costs. Burning fossil fuels leads to rising greenhouse gases and other health related issues;
removal of nuclear waste and the containment of nuclear material in the case of power plant
failure; destruction of the environment associated with hydroelectric power; and how to provide
the infrastructure to disseminate the electricity are a small number of consequences associated
with the current state of technology as we segue to greener sources of energy.
In addition, concerns raised by Ozturk (2010) regarding the need for more robust, and varied,
econometric methods and data. While this paper presents a battery of results using a fixed vector
of human capital, institutional and real GDP variables, the results are robust to other sets of
controls. Ideally, as an extension, a longer sample period would be used to corroborate the results
presented here, which would also allow for time series analysis.
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Tables
Table 1: Data Description and Sources
Source
Dependent Variables
ln Gini Coefficient World Bank, Development Research
Group
Income Share Ratio of 20% and 10% World Bank, Development Research
Group
Energy Variables
ln Per Capita kWhs IEA Statistics
ln Total BTU U.S. Energy Information Administration
(US-EIA)
ln CO2 Emission per $GDP Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Cen-
ter
Control Variables
ln per capita real GDP (local currency
units)
World Bank national accounts data, and
OECD National Accounts data files
Area 2C: Protection of Property Rights Fraser Institute
Area 5Civ: Bribery: Fraser Institute
Adjusted primary enrollment rate
(% school age children)
UNESCO Institute for Statistics.
Health expenditure (% GDP) World Health Organization Global Health
Expenditure
Investment non-financial assests (%GDP) International Monetary Fund, Government
Finance Statistics Yearbook
Government consumption (%GDP) World Bank national accounts data and
OECD National Accounts data files
Value Added Manufacturing (%GDP) World Bank national accounts data, and
OECD National Accounts
Percent rural population World Bank Staff based on United Nations,
World Urbanization Prospects
IMF Global Recession International Monetary Fund
Notes: All data are from the World Bank Development Indicators database except the
Freedom indices which are from the Fraser Institute and the BTU data which is from US-
EIA
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Veariable N Mean Median St. Dev Min Max
ln Gini 1141 3.66 3.65 0.25 2.79 4.19
10% Income Ratio 1140 22.05 12.15 37.35 2.82 755.00
20% Income Ratio 1140 9.72 7.12 7.28 2.23 81.66
ln pc kWhs 3186 7.35 7.60 1.57 2.60 10.91
ln BTUs 3535 -1.35 -1.58 2.26 -6.21 4.78
ln CO2 3902 -1.29 -1.29 0.76 -4.86 1.13
% Primary Educ Enroll 2411 87.95 95.02 16.14 19.15 100.00
Exp Health % GDP 3344 6.12 5.82 2.32 1.45 17.14
Mean Bribe & Property
Rights
1830 1.64 1.64 0.35 -0.08 2.26
ln pc RGDP 4199 10.83 10.58 2.37 3.99 17.33
Government %GDP 4008 16.03 15.60 6.35 2.05 76.22
Investment %GDP 3986 23.43 22.20 11.01 -0.69 219.07
% Rural Pop 4297 44.77 44.55 23.65 0 94.58
VA Manuf % GDP 3589 14.86 14.40 7.49 0 47.34
Latin America 4475 0.12 0 0.33 0 1
Africa 4475 0.28 0 0.45 0 1
Middle East 4475 0.07 0 0.25 0 1
Asia 4475 0.12 0 0.33 0 1
W. Europe 4475 0.10 0 0.31 0 1
E. Europe 4475 0.10 0 0.31 0 1
Russian Federation 4475 0.06 0 0.24 0 1
OECD 4475 0.17 0 0.38 0 1
(ex-) Communist 4475 0.16 0 0.37 0 1
IMF Recession 4475 0.35 0 0.48 0 1
21
Table 3: Random and Fixed Effect Benchmark Models
Gini 20% Ratio 10% Ratio
Random Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed
Education Only
% Primary Educ Enroll -0.003∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.116 -0.159 -0.030 -0.036
(0.019) (0.005) (0.709) (0.718) (0.484) (0.550)
R2o 0.683 0.000 0.255 0.000 0.598 0.000
Obs. 565 565 565 565 565 565
Health Only
Exp Health %GDP 0.005 0.008 -0.897 1.368 0.260∗ 0.565∗
(0.441) (0.178) (0.357) (0.480) (0.095) (0.054)
R2o 0.675 0.001 0.250 0.000 0.579 0.011
Obs. 718 718 718 718 718 718
Education and Health
% Primary Educ Enroll -0.003∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.098 -0.154 -0.033 -0.034
(0.019) (0.006) (0.753) (0.727) (0.438) (0.579)
Exp Health %GDP 0.001 0.005 -0.861 1.217 0.150 0.432∗
(0.875) (0.442) (0.416) (0.438) (0.309) (0.079)
R2o 0.682 0.001 0.256 0.000 0.596 0.002
Obs. 565 565 565 565 565 565
Notes: Robust p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. RE model includes
regional dummy variables. Control variables include: per capita real GDP, average bribery and
property rights freedom indices, investment share of GDP, government share of GDP, percent rural
population, % GDP value added from manufacturing, and time fixed effects.
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Table 4: Random and Fixed Effect Models: Per Capita kWhs and BTUs
Gini 20% Ratio 10% Ratio
Random Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed
kWhs
ln pc kWhs -0.050 -0.130∗ 4.290 -6.180 -0.913 -3.493∗
(0.105) (0.096) (0.638) (0.558) (0.314) (0.053)
% Primary Educ Enroll -0.004∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.440 -0.314 -0.050 -0.062
(0.019) (0.003) (0.427) (0.458) (0.387) (0.335)
Exp Health %GDP 0.003 0.004 -0.906 1.313 0.321∗∗ 0.464∗
(0.739) (0.472) (0.507) (0.433) (0.046) (0.054)
Mean Bribe & Prop Rights 0.151∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ -25.503 -7.455 1.889 2.728
(0.001) (0.004) (0.225) (0.572) (0.175) (0.162)
R2o 0.709 0.024 0.262 0.000 0.615 0.010
ρ 0.884 0.987 0.144 0.763 0.578 0.947
Obs. 541 541 541 541 541 541
BTUs
ln BTUs -0.019∗ -0.116∗∗∗ 0.133 -14.183 -0.369 -5.003∗∗
(0.066) (0.003) (0.917) (0.298) (0.190) (0.044)
% Primary Educ Enroll -0.004∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.041 -0.192 -0.033 -0.061
(0.010) (0.001) (0.895) (0.667) (0.438) (0.326)
Exp Health %GDP 0.002 0.005 -0.759 1.144 0.185 0.408∗
(0.802) (0.418) (0.481) (0.464) (0.262) (0.085)
Mean Bribe & Prop Rights 0.139∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ -22.260 -8.401 1.649 2.666
(0.003) (0.004) (0.186) (0.570) (0.242) (0.238)
ln pc RGDP -0.001 0.128 -1.833 12.253 -0.288 3.680
(0.953) (0.255) (0.300) (0.629) (0.178) (0.309)
Notes: Robust p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Control variables
include: investment share of GDP, government share of GDP, percent rural population, and %
GDP value added from manufacturing and time fixed effects. RE model includes regional dummy
variables.
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Table 6: 2SLS Fixed and Random Effects Models
Per capita KwHs Aggregate BTUs
Gini 10% Raio 20% Ratio Gini 10% Ratio 20% Ratio
Random Effects
ln pc kWhs -0.458∗∗∗ 2.993 -6.428∗∗ – – –
(0.000) (0.881) (0.044)
ln BTUs – – – -0.172∗∗∗ 3.481 -1.757
(0.000) (0.703) (0.193)
% Primary Educ Enroll 0.001 -0.358 0.042 -0.004∗∗∗ -0.043 -0.038
(0.694) (0.584) (0.612) (0.007) (0.929) (0.502)
Exp Health %GDP 0.009 -0.669 0.498∗∗ 0.004 -0.710 0.292
(0.120) (0.701) (0.021) (0.417) (0.696) (0.134)
Mean Bribe & Prop Rights 0.260∗∗∗ -24.249 3.915∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ -15.903 1.872
(0.000) (0.116) (0.035) (0.000) (0.192) (0.142)
ln pc RGDP 0.014 -2.108 -0.054 -0.004 -2.056 -0.322
(0.135) (0.139) (0.812) (0.655) (0.163) (0.162)
R2o 0.468 0.260 0.537 0.268 0.242 0.493
ρ 0.830 0.224 0.571 0.882 0.330 0.668
Fixed Effects
ln pc kWhs -0.764∗∗∗ -92.429 -24.887∗∗∗ – – –
(0.000) (0.249) (0.001)
ln BTUs – – – -0.334∗∗∗ -39.327 -9.941∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.265) (0.001)
% Primary Educ Enroll -0.005∗∗ -0.179 -0.039 -0.007∗∗∗ -0.338 -0.090
(0.014) (0.858) (0.685) (0.000) (0.720) (0.262)
Exp Health %GDP 0.002 0.833 0.343 0.004 1.022 0.383
(0.796) (0.784) (0.234) (0.369) (0.720) (0.113)
Mean Bribe & Prop Rights 0.176∗∗∗ -4.581 3.816∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ -5.612 3.211∗∗
(0.000) (0.817) (0.043) (0.000) (0.764) (0.043)
ln pc RGDP 0.419∗∗∗ 46.361 11.965∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 23.254 5.839∗∗
(0.000) (0.287) (0.004) (0.000) (0.432) (0.020)
R2o 0.123 0.010 0.070 0.001 0.000 0.000
ρ 0.997 0.954 0.992 0.995 0.909 0.986
Obs. 538 538 538 561 561 561
Notes: Robust p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Control variables include:
investment share of GDP, government share of GDP, percent rural population, and % GDP value added from
manufacturing. Includes time fixed effects. Random effect model includes regional dummy variables. First stage,
energy variable is a function of pollution, CO2.
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Table 7: GMM and System GMM
GMM System GMM
Gini 10% Ratio 20% Ratio Gini 10% Ratio 20% Ratio
Per Capita kWhs
ln pc kWhs 0.014 -16.09∗∗∗ -2.149∗∗∗ 0.0151 -2.348∗∗∗ -3.949∗∗∗
(0.693) (0.000) (0.000) (0.120) (0.000) (0.000)
L.ln pc kWhs -0.077∗∗∗ -41.52∗∗∗ -4.202∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -13.64∗∗∗ -3.440∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
% Primary Educ En-
roll
-0.0023∗∗∗ -1.458∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ 0.0001 -2.722∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.500) (0.000) (0.000)
Exp Health %GDP 0.005∗∗∗ -0.410∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -2.939∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Mean Bribe & Prop
Rights
0.067∗∗∗ 18.28∗∗∗ 6.232∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ -22.85∗∗∗ 4.303∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln pc RGDP -0.049∗∗ 35.75∗∗∗ -3.511∗∗∗ 0.0129 -0.881∗∗∗ -0.852∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.000) (0.000) (0.509) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs. 354 354 354 432 432 432
Total BTUs
ln BTUs -0.014∗∗ -0.170 -0.289∗∗∗ -0.005 3.911∗∗∗ 1.718∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.251) (0.001) (0.358) (0.000) (0.000)
L.ln BTUs -0.013∗∗ -34.17∗∗∗ -4.645∗∗∗ 0.001 -14.15∗∗∗ -6.128∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.000) (0.000) (0.918) (0.000) (0.000)
% Primary Educ En-
roll
-0.003∗∗∗ -1.398∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ 0.001 -2.577∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.177) (0.000) (0.000)
Exp Health %GDP 0.005∗∗∗ -0.923∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ -0.0001 -4.795∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.897) (0.000) (0.000)
Mean Bribe & Prop
Rights
0.090∗∗∗ 17.76∗∗∗ 5.796∗∗∗ 0.002 -34.49∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.793) (0.000) (0.000)
ln pc RGDP -0.108∗∗∗ 15.50∗∗∗ -4.825∗∗∗ 0.00513 -1.805∗∗∗ -1.520∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.505) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs. 358 358 358 436 436 436
Notes: Twostep GMM p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Control variables include:
investment share of GDP, government share of GDP, percent rural population, and % GDP value added from
manufacturing. Includes time fixed effects. Results for lagged dependent variables are not included.
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Table 12: Asymmetric RE and FE Models
Top 10% Bottom 10% Top 20% Bottom 20%
Random Effects
ln PC kWhs -1.425 0.140 -1.667* 0.358
(0.126) (0.301) (0.082) (0.185)
% Primary Educ Enroll -0.067 0.018** -0.082 0.032**
(0.266) (0.035) (0.161) (0.043)
Exp Health %GDP 0.156 -0.045 0.202 -0.083
(0.303) (0.201) (0.243) (0.208)
Mean Bribe & Prop
Rights
3.188*** -0.651** 3.878*** -1.351***
(0.002) (0.012) (0.001) (0.005)
ln pc RGDP 0.160 0.013 0.127 0.026
(0.479) (0.759) (0.623) (0.765)
R2o 0.746 0.601 0.750 0.674
Fixed Effects
ln PC kWhs -3.637** 0.465 -3.949** 0.993
(0.047) (0.226) (0.040) (0.178)
% Primary Educ Enroll -0.090 0.026*** -0.108* 0.044**
(0.165) (0.007) (0.084) (0.012)
Exp Health %GDP 0.140 -0.047 0.188 -0.089
(0.398) (0.128) (0.289) (0.132)
Mean Bribe & Prop
Rights
2.882** -0.619** 3.623*** -1.308***
(0.014) (0.024) (0.005) (0.009)
ln pc RGDP 1.895 -0.689 2.145 -1.130
(0.408) (0.261) (0.410) (0.326)
R2o 0.195 0.000 0.161 0.005
Obs. 541 541 541 541
Notes: Robust p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Constant, time fixed effects, and control variables excluded for clarity. Random
effect model includes regional fixed effects.
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Table 13: Asymmetric IV and 2SLS FE Models
Top 10% Bottom 10% Top 20% Bottom 20%
FE-IV
ln PC kWhs -4.548∗∗∗ 0.380 -4.595∗∗∗ 0.918∗∗
(0.000) (0.108) (0.000) (0.041)
% Primary Educ Enroll -0.093∗ 0.027∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.001) (0.031) (0.003)
Exp Health %GDP 0.123 -0.046∗∗ 0.172 -0.087∗∗
(0.332) (0.033) (0.173) (0.035)
Mean Bribe & Prop Rights 3.240∗∗∗ -0.646∗∗∗ 3.986∗∗∗ -1.374∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln pc RGDP 2.103 -0.634∗ 2.230 -1.058
(0.125) (0.087) (0.153) (0.132)
F−stat 10.730 9.084 12.016 8.556
Obs. 529 529 529 529
2SLS
ln PC kWhs -21.486∗∗∗ 4.217∗∗∗ -23.775∗∗∗ 8.196∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
% Primary Educ Enroll -0.067 0.022∗ -0.083 0.035
(0.229) (0.063) (0.161) (0.102)
Exp Health %GDP 0.066 -0.033 0.105 -0.060
(0.695) (0.356) (0.558) (0.349)
Mean Bribe & Prop Rights 3.343∗∗∗ -0.712∗∗∗ 4.142∗∗∗ -1.489∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
ln pc RGDP 9.761∗∗∗ -2.346∗∗∗ 10.874∗∗∗ -4.309∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2o 0.208 0.044 0.190 0.078
Obs. 540 540 540 540
Notes:Robust p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Constant and control variables exlcuded for clarity.
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Table 14: Asymmetric Dynamic Panel GMM Models
Top 10 Bottom 10 Top 20 Bottom 20
GMM
ln PC kWhs 2.047*** -0.110 0.790 -0.269**
(0.001) (0.248) (0.104) (0.044)
L.ln PC kWhs -4.641*** 0.211** -3.497*** 0.191
(0.000) (0.027) (0.000) (0.333)
% Primary Educ Enroll -0.057*** 0.007*** -0.051*** 0.013***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Exp Health %GDP 0.091* -0.042*** 0.096*** -0.063***
(0.077) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000)
Mean Bribe & Prop Rights 2.278*** -0.425*** 2.744*** -0.853***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln pc RGDP -2.043*** 0.263** -2.110*** 0.974***
(0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs. 354 354 354 354
System GMM
ln PC kWhs 0.363 0.083 0.930** 0.156*
(0.300) (0.214) (0.019) (0.080)
L.ln PC kWhs -4.101*** 0.180* -3.527*** 0.764***
(0.000) (0.075) (0.000) (0.000)
% Primary Educ Enroll -0.015** 0.007*** -0.001 0.005**
(0.037) (0.000) (0.609) (0.018)
Exp Health %GDP 0.138*** -0.023*** 0.018 -0.082***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.752) (0.000)
Mean Bribe & Prop Rights 1.768*** -0.207*** 1.699*** -0.508***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln pc RGDP 0.538*** -0.013 0.053 -0.240***
(0.003) (0.770) (0.822) (0.000)
Obs. 432 432 432 432
Robust p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Constant and
control variables exlcuded for clarity.
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Figures
Figure 1: Mean log Gini Coefficient and Upper and Lower Bound
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Figure 2: Mean Income Ratio and Upper and Lower Bound
Figure 3: Mean Per capita log kWhs and Upper and Lower Bound
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Appendix
A Countries in Sample
Table A1: List of Countries
Country CID Country CID Country CID
Albania ALB Gambia, The GMB Nicaragua NIC
Algeria DZA Georgia GEO Niger NER
Angola AGO Germany DEU Nigeria NGA
Argentina ARG Ghana GHA Norway NOR
Armenia ARM Greece GRC Oman OMN
Australia AUS Greenland GRL Pakistan PAK
Austria AUT Grenada GRD Panama PAN
Azerbaijan AZE Guatemala GTM Papua New Guinea PNG
Bahamas, The BHS Guinea GIN Paraguay PRY
Bahrain BHR Guinea-Bissau GNB Peru PER
Bangladesh BGD Guyana GUY Philippines PHL
Barbados BRB Haiti HTI Poland POL
Belarus BLR Honduras HND Portugal PRT
Belgium BEL Hong Kong SAR, China HKG Puerto Rico PRI
Belize BLZ Hungary HUN Qatar QAT
Benin BEN Iceland ISL Romania ROM
Bermuda BMU India IND Russia RUS
Bhutan BTN Indonesia IDN Rwanda RWA
Bolivia BOL Iran, Islamic Rep. IRN Samoa WSM
Bosnia and Herzegovina BIH Iraq IRQ Saudi Arabia SAU
Botswana BWA Ireland IRL Senegal SEN
Brazil BRA Israel ISR Serbia SRB
Brunei Darussalam BRN Italy ITA Seychelles SYC
Bulgaria BGR Jamaica JAM Sierra Leone SLE
Burkina Faso BFA Japan JPN Singapore SGP
Burundi BDI Jordan JOR Slovak Republic SVK
Cambodia KHM Kazakhstan KAZ Slovenia SVN
Cameroon CMR Kenya KEN South Africa ZAF
Canada CAN Korea, Rep. KOR Spain ESP
Central African Republic CAF Kuwait KWT Sri Lanka LKA
Chad TCD Kyrgyz Republic KGZ Sudan SDN
Chile CHL Lao PDR LAO Suriname SUR
China CHN Latvia LVA Swaziland SWZ
Colombia COL Lebanon LBN Sweden SWE
Comoros COM Lesotho LSO Switzerland CHE
Congo, Dem. Rep. ZAR Liberia LBR Syrian Arab Republic SYR
Costa Rica CRI Libya LBY Tajikistan TJK
Cote d’Ivoire CIV Lithuania LTU Tanzania TZA
Croatia HRV Luxembourg LUX Thailand THA
Cuba CUB Macedonia, FYR MKD Togo TGO
Cyprus CYP Madagascar MDG Tonga TON
Czech Republic CZE Malawi MWI Trinidad and Tobago TTO
Denmark DNK Malaysia MYS Tunisia TUN
Djibouti DJI Mali MLI Turkey TUR
Dominica DMA Malta MLT Turkmenistan TKM
Dominican Republic DOM Mauritania MRT Uganda UGA
Ecuador ECU Mauritius MUS Ukraine UKR
Egypt, Arab Rep. EGY Mexico MEX United Arab Emirates ARE
El Salvador SLV Moldova MDA United Kingdom GBR
Equatorial Guinea GNQ Mongolia MNG United States USA
Eritrea ERI Montenegro MNE Uruguay URY
Estonia EST Morocco MAR Uzbekistan UZB
Ethiopia ETH Mozambique MOZ Venezuela, RB VEN
Fiji FJI Namibia NAM Vietnam VNM
Finland FIN Nepal NPL Yemen, Rep. YEM
France FRA Netherlands NLD Zambia ZMB
Gabon GAB New Zealand NZL Zimbabwe ZWE
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